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COMMENTS
CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS: DOES IT
VIOLATE THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT-Ingraham v. Wright, 525 F.2d 909
(5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 2200 (1976).
Few would deny the extensive authority possessed by the states
to establish, regulate, and supervise the educational systems within
their respective domains. However well-established that authority
may be, states and school officials unmistakably remain subject to
the provisions of the Federal Constitution via the supremacy
clause.' The Supreme Court of the United States has voiced its
unequivocal affirmance of this concept: "In our system, stateoperated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism. School
officials do not possess absolute authority over their students.
Students in school as well as out of a school are 'persons' under our
Constitution."' Acknowledgement of constitutional rights of students compels the recognition of a cause of action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 19831 for the deprivation of these rights by state officials.
The simplicity of the above statements is quite deceptive. The
complexity of pursuing this cause of action lies primarily in the task
of sustaining the allegation that the specific commissions or omissions of the state officials did indeed violate a constitutional guarantee. This was the obstacle faced by the plaintiffs in Ingraham v.
Wright,4 who unsuccessfully attempted to demonstrate that the corporal punishment authorized and administered by defendant school
officials deprived them of their constitutional right to be free from
cruel and unusual punishment as guaranteed by the eighth amendment 5 to the Constitution.
The relative ease with which the Ingraham court dismissed the
plaintiffs' section 1983 allegations based on the eighth amendment
was not commensurate with the soundness of their contentions. The
1. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, § 2.
2. Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969); Boykin v. Fairfield
Board of Education, 492 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1975).
3. Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970):
Every person who, under color of any statute . . . of any State. .. subjects. . . any
citizen . . .to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
4. 525 F.2d 909 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 2200 (1976) (hereinafter
referred to as Ingraham).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
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viability of such contentions is the purpose to which this comment
is dedicated.
I.

INGRAHAM V. WRIGHT

Parents of public school students brought an action against the
Dade County School Board and certain school officials in their official and individual capacities. Counts one and two were individual
actions for compensatory and punitive damages brought under 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981-19881 for injuries resulting from corporal punishment administered by certain defendants. Count three was a class
action filed on behalf of the students in the entire school system
seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against the use of corporal
punishment. The plaintiffs alleged that the use of corporal punishment, on its face and as applied, constituted cruel and unusual
punishment, and that the practice and procedures implemented
denied plaintiffs liberty without due process of law in violation of
the fourteenth amendment.
By implication, state statutory authority7 existed for the use of
corporal punishment in the Dade County School, provided the
teacher involved conferred with the principal before such action was
taken. The local school board policy' was more restrictive and required the principal to determine whether corporal punishment was
in fact necessary, to designate the person to administer the punishment, and to specify a time and place for it to occur. There was also
a limitation on the number of blows that could be administered.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida found that despite the existence of these policies, the administration never posted a list of forbidden conduct to put the
students on notice, few procedural requirements were in fact enforced, there was a "widespread failure" to adhere to the board's
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-88 (1970); jurisdiction was claimed under 28 U.S.C. §
1343 (Supp. IV 1974).

7.

FLA. STAT. ANN.

1331 and

§ 232.27 (1961):

Each teacher . . . shall assume such authority for the control of the pupils as may be
assigned to him by the principal and shall keep good order in the classroom . . . but
he shall not inflict corporal punishment before consulting the principal .
and in no
case shall such punishment be degrading or severe in its nature.
The various state statutes in this area fall into three classes: (1) those prohibiting corporal
punishment, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, § 37g (Supp. 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-1
(1968); (2) those expressly permitting corporal punishment in public schools, see, e.g., CAL.
EDUC. CODE § 10854 (West 1969); and (3) those leaving disciplinary decisions to the discretion
of school administrators, see, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-221 (1967); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 122, §§ 24-24, 34-84a (Supp. 1976).
8. Dade County School Board Policy 5144; see 525 F.2d at 916 n.6.
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policy, and more blows were administered than were authorized In
addition to these deficiencies, the district court described the instances of punishment as "severe." These findings were prompted
by the testimony of students regarding the issue of whether the
school's policy and the statute retained their constitutionality as
administered. The testimony"0 depicted the circumstances which
generally triggered the imposition of physical discipline at Dade
County School and the severity of defendants' actions. As an example, for "disciplinary" purposes, one boy was hit several times on
the head and back, causing him to miss one week of classes and
requiring him to undergo surgery to remove the lump on his head
which resulted from the beating. Further evidence indicated that
the method used by an assistant principal to find the student who
whistled during class was to systematically paddle each student in
a class of thirty to fifty until one confessed. In spite of the court's
findings and the testimony of the students, the district court dismissed the action upon the defendants' motion.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and
remanded, holding that the corporal punishment, as administered,
violated the eighth amendment's proscription against cruel and
unusual punishment, and that the procedures employed violated
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment." The granting
of a petition for rehearing led to a decision by the Fifth Circuit en
banc panel "that the Eighth Amendment was intended to be applied only to punishment invoked as a sanction for criminal conduct"' and, therefore, did not apply to school discipline; that the
9. The district court's opinion is unreported; see 498 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1974) for findings
of fact.
10. Additional testimony indicated that one named plaintiff received twenty "licks"
while being held down by two administrators for leaving the school auditorium too slowly.
This resulted in hospital treatment and over one week's absence from school. An assistant
principal, on one occasion, after warning some students they would be late for class, lined
up and paddled fifteen boys. When one boy began arguing, he was thrown against the wall
and hit on his arm, back, leg, and neck. One student testified that he was paddled fifty times
for allegedly making an obscene phone call to a teacher, an act to which another boy later
confessed. Fifty licks were given to another for truancy. See 498 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1974).
11. 498 F.2d 248, 261-69, 25 A.L.R. Fed. 400, noted in 53 TEX. L. REv. 395 (1974) and
43 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1435 (1975). That school board members may be liable under § 1983
has been determined by the Supreme Court, Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1974),
holding school board members not immune if they knew or reasonably should have known
that the action would violate the constitutional rights of the student affected, or if the action
was taken with the malicious intention to cause such a deprivation of rights or other injury.
The original appellate panel also determined that the superintendent of schools sued in
his individual capacity was a "person" within the Civil Rights Act. 498 F.2d at 251-52.
12. 525 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1976).
13. Id. at 913.
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infliction of corporal punishment itself was not arbitrary and, thus,
did not deprive students of substantive due process rights; and further, that procedural due process standards need not be applied
since students did not suffer a grievous loss. 4 Three other opinions,'
including two dissents in which five judges joined, were also filed.
In apparent recognition of the importance of the issues involved
and of the conflicting decisions of the lower courts, the United
States Supreme Court has recently granted the appellants' petition
for certiorari."
The most striking feature of the Fifth Circuit's opinion on rehearing is its lack of an extensive discussion of the premise which
provided the basis for its determination, "that the Eighth Amendment does not apply to the administration of discipline, through
corporal punishment, to public school children. . . ." The court's
expressed rationale was based upon criminal connotations of the
words "bail" and "fine" in the amendment itself, " lip service to the
legislative history," and the availability of state remedies for battery.2" In further support of its conclusion, the court found that
"much greater access of school children through their parents
to
public opinion and to the political process, in addition to the natural
restraint that generally exists when one strikes a child . . .,
14. Id. at 915-20, also determining that although the superintendent was a "person,"
the school board was not.
15. Circuit Judge Gewin filed a concurring opinion stating that the majority's determination, that there is always a lack of jurisdiction over school boards conflicts with holdings
in other cases. Circuit Judge Godbold, with whom Chief Judge Brown joined, dissented,
stating that arbitrary and excessive corporal punishment is a denial of substantive due
process, though the punishment in this case did not rise to such a level. Circuit Judges
Goldberg and Ainsworth joined Circuit Judge Rives' dissenting opinion, which adhered to the
original majority opinion, and stated that these students have a constitutional right to freedom from cruel and unusual punishment under state law and are entitled to be heard in the
federal courts. Id. at 920-27.
16. 96 S. Ct. 2200 (1976). The Supreme Court limited its grant of certiorari to two
questions:
(1) Does the infliction of severe corporal punishment upon public school students,
absent notice of the charges for which punishment is to be inflicted and an opportunity
to be heard, violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? (2) Does
the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment apply to the
administration of discipline through severe corporal punishment inflicted by public
school teachers and administrators upon public school children?
Id. at 2201. This comment will limit its discussion to the latter question to be considered by
the Supreme Court.
17. 525 F.2d at 912.
18. Id. at 912-13.
19. Id. at 913.
20. Id. at 915; see Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), where the federal remedy
provided by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was said to be supplementary to any state remedy.
21. Id. at 915 n. 5 (emphasis added). This statement resulted from the court's attempt
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provided a deterrent from excessive conduct.
While the foundations of the court's opinion may possess textbook effectiveness, they ignore the severity of the instances of conduct described in the testimony of the students. The panel glossed
over the rigorous punishment imposed upon the children in a cursory manner similar to its perfunctory treatment of the eighth
amendment's applicability, by refusing "to look at each individual
instance of punishment to determine if it has been administered
arbitrarily. ''22
The court's treatment of plaintiffs' contentions is difficult to
support in light of the compelling rationale for the applicability of
the eighth amendment to physical chastisement in public schools.
II.
A.

THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT

History

Before an attempt is made to justify the application of the
eighth amendment to corporal punishment in schools, the amendment's background must be examined. Such an analysis of the history of the amendment and of the various interpretations rendered
by the courts, would have lessened the vulnerability of the Fifth
Circuit's en banc determination.
The history of the cruel and unusual punishment clause can be
traced back to England when Henry III issued the Fourth Great
Charter in 1225.1" The precise wording of the amendment, as Americans know it, was first used in the English Bill of Rights of 16884
and was later incorporated into the United States Constitution. The
American framers scarcely discussed the intended meaning of the
provision's terms, although some representatives voiced their concern that the amendment would prohibit severe punishments which
were justified in some instances. 5 Despite this, the humanitarian
views of the others prevailed.
Since the early framers did not specify the breadth they in-

to distinguish Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968) (enjoining the use of strap in
prisons).
22. 525 F.2d at 917. The reluctance of the court may be attributed to the common law
view that a teacher has the legal status of a conditionally privileged person standing in the
place of the parent, termed in loco parentis. See 68 AM. JUR. 2d Schools § 258 (1962).
23. 9 Hen. 3, c. 14 (1225); see T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 3
(1956); see also Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1957).
24. 1 W. and M., Sess. 2, C. 2 (1689); see Note, The ConstitutionalProhibitionAgainst
Cruel and Unusual Punishment-Its Present Significance, 4 VAND. L. REV. 680, 682 (1951);
see also 34 MINN. L. REV. 134, 135 (1950).
25. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 781 (1834).
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tended the clause to possess, it seems logical to turn to the clause's
definitional connotations and to the atmosphere which existed at
the time of the amendment's adoption. An exhaustive study of the
clause by one writer"6 concludes that the phrase, as established by
the English, was meant to prohibit excessive forms of punishment.
Tracing the rationale of the clause from its inception, the author
found that a prohibition against any form of excessive punishment
existed at common law well before the adoption of England's Bill
of Rights in 1688,27 apparently because, in the seventeenth century,
the word "cruel" had a "less onerous" connotation. It appears,
then, that a concept of proportionality originally compelled the inclusion of the word cruel into our eighth amendment.
The term "unusual," by its very nature, seems to lend itself
more to changing social interpretations. It appears, however, the
term "unusual" was not intended to mean simply novel or different,
for common forms of punishment, mentioned during the legislative
debates, were also targets of the amendment." Further, had "new"
forms of punishment been prohibited by the term "unusual," gas
chambers, electric chairs, and updated methods of punishment
would, by their very natures, have been declared unconstitutional.
Too, this interpretation would permit a charge of shortsightedness
against the framers, not evident in other portions of the Constitution. Thus, the case for an interpretation of proportionate punishment, capable of covering the taking on of new forms as well as the
discarding of old forms, becomes stronger.
The Supreme Court of the United States has had several opportunities to define the terms of the cruel and unusual punishment
clause more precisely. Wisely or not, the Court has never chosen to
do so. Rather, perhaps believing a specific definition would do injustice to the apparent intent of permitting changing social patterns
to mold the amendment's meaning, the Court has approached the
subject carefully: "Difficulty would attend the effort to define with
exactness the extent of the Constitutional provisions which provides
that cruel and unusual punishment should not be inflicted . . .,,30
While lacking specificity, the Court's pronouncements over the
26. Grannucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted": The Original
Meaning. 57 CAL. L. REV. 839 (1969); for another excellent study, see Wheeler, Toward a
Theory of Limited Punishment: An Examination of the Eighth Amendment, 24 STAN. L. REV.
838 (1972).
27. Grannuci, supra note 26, at 847.
28. Id.at 860, citing 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *16-17 (8th ed. 1778) as stating
that the word "cruel" was used as a synonym for severe or excessive.
29.
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 754 (1789).
30. Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135-36 (1879).
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years offer some guidance toward a proper interpretation of the
amendment in terms of corporal punishment. The Court, in Trop
v. Dulles, :" viewed the phrase as being based on the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."
Elsewhere in Trop v. Dulles, the Court stated, "The basic concept
underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity
of man.": 2 Wilkerson v. Utah,33 O'Neil v. Vermont,3 4 and Weems v.
United States:" each, in some manner, attempted to distinguish
between "cruel" and "unusual," but the specific differences exacted
were superficial at best. While the precise scope of the amendment
did not emerge from these cases, each, to some degree, held that the
clause contained a basic proscription against severe and inhuman
treatment. The Weems Court further announced, "The clause...
is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public
opinion becomes enlightened by human justice."3 A more helpful
guideline was formulated in O'Neil v. Vermont, which held that
punishments disproportionate to the offense committed were within
the purview of the eighth amendment. 7 This concept of excessiveness was later formally solidified in Weems v. United States, which
announced, "[P]unishment for crime should be graduated and proportionate to offense." ' The American interpretation, thus, eventually converged with that of its English ancestry.
B.

In a Civil Context

In view of the various and rather flexible standards pronounced
over the years, it is not surprising to discover that the Supreme
31. 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
32. Id. at 100.
33. 99 U.S. 130 (1879).
34. 144 U.S. 323 (1892).
35. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
36. Id. at 378.
37. However, the Court in O'Neil held that the eighth amendment was not applicable
to the states. Application to the states was first implied in Louisiana ex rel. Francis v.
Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), made the amendment applicable to the states via the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment; the
first case to clearly hold that the states are bound by the eighth amendment was Johnson v.
Dye, 175 F.2d 250, 256 (3rd Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 338 U.S. 864 (1949).
38. 217 U.S. 349, 367. Several courts, feeling the need for more concrete guidance,
simplified the matter tremendously by deeming the clause inapplicable wherever the punishment was authorized by a valid statute: United States v. Ragen, 54 F. Supp. 973 (N.D. Ill.
1944), af'd, 146 F.2d 349 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 865 (1945) (199-year sentence for
murder, parole eligibility only after completion of one-third of the term, valid); People v.
Dixon, 400 I1. 449, 81 N.E.2d 257 (1948) (although "unusual," 199-year rape sentence not
violative of the eighth amendment); People v. Bernovich, 391 111.141, 62 N.E.2d 691, cert.
denied, 326 U.S. 798 (1945) (150-year murder sentence constitutional); People v. Fog, 365 Ill.
389. 52 N.E.2d 699 (1944) (where life sentence authorized for rape, 99-year sentence valid).
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Court has never declared the prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishments to be exclusively applicable to criminal sanctions. The
Court, on one occasion, approached such an announcement but, for
unexpressed reasons, fell short of an absolute proscription: "The
primary purpose of that clause has always been considered, and
properly so, to be directed at the method or kind of punishment
imposed for the violation on criminal statutes . . .,"I The court's
selection of the word "primary" indicates a definite reluctance to
rule the clause exclusively applicable to criminal contexts. The
Ingraham court thought otherwise, however, presumably equating
the words "primary purpose" with "exclusive purpose."
The Supreme Court's opinion in Trop v. Dulles" further weakens Ingraham's conclusion, for Trop involved denationalization a
civil, not criminal, sanction. In declaring denationalization a cruel
and unusual punishment, the majority focused upon the substance
rather than the form of the challenged statute4 ' and determined the
sanction was "penal" in nature as it destroyed an individual's valued status as an American citizen. In reaching its conclusion, the
Court proposed two tests to determine the meaning of "penal": (1)
whether there was "disability for the purposes of punishment," 2
and (2) whether "the prescription of a consequence will befall one
who fails to abide by these regulatory provisions."43 Both the original appellate panel in Ingraham and the commentator cited therein
believed that "[i]nfliction of punishment by public school personnel meets both these tests."4 It does not seem to be an unreasonable
observation that corporal punishment as used by school officials is
imposed to punish and deter impermissible conduct and, therefore,
shares some characteristics of criminal sanctions. In fact, the conduct punished in schools is very often criminal in nature. The particular flexibility of the tests set out in Trop v. Dulles demonstrates
the possible application of the eighth amendment to civil sanctions
and, further, to the use of corporal punishment in public schools.
39. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 531-32 (1968) (emphasis added); however, few dictionaries will equate "primary" with "only" or "exclusive." Gonyaw v. Gray, 361 F. Supp.
366, 368 (D. Vt. 1973) based its decision that the eighth amendment does not apply to corporal
punishment in public schools on this statement from Powell v. Texas; but see Roberts v. Way,
398 F. Supp. 856, 859-61 (D.Vt. 1975) for a contrary interpretation of this statement.
40. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
41. The Nationality Act of 1940, 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g), as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(8)
(1970).
42. 356 U.S. at 96.
43. Id. at 97.
44. 498 F.2d 248, 259-60 n.20, citing 6 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIv. LIB. L. REV. 583, 585 n.24
(1975).
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That a statute was written under the guise of a civil label
should not, in and of itself, determine its validity under the eighth
amendment. The spirit and the purpose of the amendment, as well
as the standards set forth by the Supreme Court, seem to demand
a more exacting measure. Surely there is a danger in permitting
legislators and public officials to circumvent a constitutional
amendment so easily.45 A label can be a deceptive device. The Seventh Circuit in Vann v. Scott46 voiced this objection in a straightforward manner:
Since-the argument runs-by definition the treatment is not "punishment," it obviously cannot be "cruel and unusual punishment."
But neither the label which a State places on its own conduct, nor
even the legitimacy of its motivation, can avoid the applicability of
the Federal Constitution. We have no doubt that well intentioned
attempts to rehabilitate a child could, in extreme circumstances,
and unusual punishment proscribed by the Eighth
constitute cruel
7
Amendment.1
Several other cases in which state officials defended their methods of punishment by describing them as "treatment" or "therapy"
or "discipline" have resulted in application of the eighth amendment's prohibition. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
the trial court's dismissal in Knecht v. Gillman" and found the
administration of a drug to inmates of a state mental institution as
part of an "aversion therapy program" to be cruel and unusual
punishment. The Seventh Circuit in Nelson v. Heyne5 held that the
disciplinary measures (beatings and tranquilizers) imposed upon
those in a medium security state correctional institution for boys,
one-third of whom were non-criminal offenders, were cruel and unusual punishment. To reach that conclusion, the Seventh Circuit
implemented a test of cruel and unusual punishment as outlined in
Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Furman v. Georgia:"W
45. See Toepleman v. United States, 263 F.2d 697, 700 (4th Cir. 1959):
IWIhile the Eighth Amendment has generally been thought to apply only to criminal
cases ... there would seem to be no basis in reason why a court could not invoke the
Eighth Amendment, either specifically or by analogy, to prevent an abuse of the power
of punishment though it be only manifested in a civil form. (citations omitted).
46. 467 F.2d 1235 (7th Cir. 1972), striking down the contention that a state's incarceration of runaway minors could not violate the amendment because the law did not authorize
punishment of the juveniles.
47. Id. at 1240 (emphasis added).
48. 488 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973).
49. 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974).
50. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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The final principle inherent in the Clause is that a severe punishment
must not be excessive. A punishment is excessive

. . .

if it is unneces-

sary: The infliction of a severe punishment by the State cannot comport with human dignity when it is nothing more than pointless infliction of suffering. If there is a significantly less severe punishment
adequate to achieve the purposes for which the punishment is inflicted, . . . the punishment is unnecessary and therefore excessive.5
On its surface, this standard sets no limits as to the amendment's
use regarding civil sanctions. Further, it raises several questions as
to the existence of alternative means and pointless infliction of suffering.52
C.

Corporal Punishment

The above discussion suggests that the history and the various
interpretations of the cruel and unusual punishment clause provide
an ample basis for application of the amendment in a civil context,
and more specifically, to corporal punishment in public schools.
Several lower courts have considered this issue and some render
further support for this contention.
Basically, the case law represents three schools of thought. The
first group, consisting of two cases, '" exemplify the Ingraham en
banc panel's belief that the eighth amendment is not applicable.
Both cited Powell v. Texas"' as declaring that the cruel and unusual
punishment provision relates only to criminal sanctions, presumably equating the terms "primary purpose" with "exclusive purpose." Their conclusions dictate a belief that the Powell Court either overlooked, overruled, or ignored its former Trop v. Dulles5
decision which determined that a civil sanction constituted cruel
and unusual punishment.
Several cases " express the second and majority view. They
assumed, without deciding, that the amendment applies but found
51. 408 U.S. at 279 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
52. That less severe and possibly more effective alternatives to corporal punishment
exist would seem significant not only in terms of cruel and unusual lunishment standards
as indicated by ,Justice Brennan, but also in light of the fourteenth amendment's standard
requiring reasonable means directed toward a legitimate state purpose.
53. Sims v. Waln, 388 F. Supp. 543 (S.D. Ohio 1974); Gonyaw v. Gray, 361 F. Supp.
366 (D.Vt. 1973).
54. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
55. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
56. Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294 (M.D.N.C.), aff d, 423 U.S. 907 (1975); Coffman
v. Kuehler, 409 F. Supp. 546 (ND. Tex. 1976); Roberts v. Way, 398 F. Supp. 856 (D.Vt. 1975);
Sims v. Board of Education, 329 F. Supp. 678 (D.N.M. 1971); Ware v. Estes, 328 F. Supp.
657 (N.D. Tex. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 458 F.2d 1360 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1027
(1972).
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that the punishment complained of was not severe enough to be
deemed violative. These cases primarily involved conceptual objections to the overall policy of permitting corporal punishment rather
than to particular instances of severe beatings. The opinions dealt
with the state's authority over educational matters and concluded
that corporal punishment was not cruel and unusual per se. Each,
however, cautioned that unreasonable and excessive instances of
physical chastisement could result in eighth amendment violations.-7 In this regard, one interesting comment on the Ingraham
case, admittedly dicta, was voiced by the Baker v. Owen court:
"[Tihis record does not begin to present a picture of punishment
comparable to that in Ingraham . . . , which we believe indicate
the kind of beatings that could constitute cruel and unusual
punishment if the Eighth Amendment is indeed applicable. 5 This
second group of cases thus expressed not only a recognition of the
severity of the beatings in Ingraham and parental concern over corporal punishment but also displayed the judiciary's increasing hesitation to rule the provision exclusively applicable in criminal sanction contexts.
One lone case, Bramlet v. Wilson,59 comprises the third view by
unequivocally holding the eighth amendment applicable to corporal
punishment in public schools, while carefully noting it was not
deciding whether physical discipline is per se unconstitutional.
Bramlet expanded the reasoning of Knecht v. Gillman"° by embracing the view that if the label "treatment" cannot shield a practice
from eight amendment scrutiny then neither can the label "discipline." For its determination of what constitutes excessiveness,
Bramlet relied on a leading prison case, Jackson v. Bishop.6' The
appellants in Ingraham unsuccessfully urged this comparison to
prison cases. 2
57. E.g., Roberts v. Way, 398 F. Supp. 856, 860:
That is not to say the statute as applied may not result in punishment that is both
cruel and unusual within the proscription of the Eighth Amendment according to the
severity of the punishment administered in the circumstances of a particular case.
(citations omitted).
58. 395 F. Supp. at 303 (emphasis added).
59. 495 F.2d 714 (8th Cir. 1974), noted in, 7 CONN. L. REV. 116 (1974).
60. 488 F*2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973).
61. 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968), holding the disciplinary measures employed in prisons
(e.g., beating with a strap) constituted cruel and unusual punishment.
62. See 525 F.2d at 914-15; the Ingraham court believed the bounds of logic are not
violated by extending the amendment to cover the incarceration of criminals because imprisonment is the fulfillment of criminal sanctions. Whether this distinction justifies the use of
the eighth amendment in the prison context but not in the school context is debatable.
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While divergent outlooks by the lower courts are not uncommon, they exemplify the confusion that pervades the question of the
propriety of schools' administration of corporal punishment in
terms of the eighth amendment's prohibition. Despite the relative
novelty and complexity of the issue, the Ingraham en banc panel
dealt with the subject in a conclusive fashion: "Not only the connotation of the words 'bail' and 'fine,' but the legislative history
concerning enactment of the bill of rights supports an argument
that the Eighth Amendment was intended to be applied only to
punishment invoked for criminal conduct." 3 In addition to the fact
that the plaintiffs' contentions appear to have been rejected solely
on the basis of the "connotations" of words and on "arguments"
that the eighth amendment does not apply, the legislative history
of the clause, as has been demonstrated above, supports a firmer,
sounder argument that the clause can apply to civil sanctions. The
Ingraham panel totally omitted a discussion of the eighth amendment standards that have been drawn by the Supreme Court. 4 Had
this been offered, the court may have discovered that school children, like prisoners, may be confronted with instances of "discipline" that affront "dignity" and "decency"-instances which
could be described as "shocking," "excessive," and "disproportionate" to the act committed."
III.

CORPORAL PUNISHMENT AND SOCIAL CONSIDERATIONS

Understandably, courts have been reluctant to interfere with
the policies and practices implemented in our schools. 6 Despite
this, the Supreme Court has stated, "The vigilant protection of
constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools." 7 Accordingly, students' right to protest has been protected;' they cannot be compelled to salute the
flag, " and students must be afforded due process rights when
suspended ,7 dismissed,7 or transferred7 2 for disciplinary reasons.
63. Id. at 912-13 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
64. See pp. 44-46 supra for a discussion of these standards.
65. It was this analysis that formed the basis of the original Ingraham court's determination that the amendment was applicable. 498 F.2d 248, 259-61. Implementation of the Trop
v. Dulles tests further convinced the original court, but proved unpersuasive to the en banc
panel.
66. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) for a discussion of state and local
authority to prescribe and control the daily operation of schools.
67. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960).
68. Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
69. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
70. Gosier v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
71. Woods v. Wright, 334 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1964); Esteban v. Central Mo. State
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The rationale underlying these holdings is the seriousness of the
actions taken against the students-actions that may affect their
reputation and future careers-and a recognition of students' fundamental interests.
The preservation of the physical integrity of citizens is an important element in the American concept of freedom. The treatment
75
of suspects,7" arrestees,7" mentally retarded youths, inmates of juvenile detention centers, " and prison inmates" has been afforded
intense scrutiny in recognition of this interest. Students should be
entitled to similar protections. The standards proposed by the various courts, emphasizing excessiveness and disproportionality, demonstrate that the eighth amendment provides an avenue by which
student physical integrity may be safeguarded.
If corporal punishment was an effective educational tool, if
abuses were nonexistent, and if the effects of physical punishment
lasted only as long as the resulting pain, it would be desirable and
practical to leave the determination of whether to condone, encourage, or prohibit corporal punishment in the hands of that group of
professionals within the educational system itself. Unfortunately,
the evidence suggests otherwise.
The Report of the Task Force on Corporal Punishment," the
result of a nationwide study completed by teachers, educators, students, and administrators, leaves little room for debate concerning
the propriety of corporal punishment as a means of student control.
The National Education Association (NEA) task force expressed
sixteen general conclusions7 9 about the desirability of corporal punCollege, 277 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Mo. 1967).
72. Owens v. Develin, Civil No. 69-118-G (D. Mass. 1969).
73. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1967), citing, Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Botsford,
141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891): "No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the
common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own
person . ..
74. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
75. Wheeler v. Glass, 473 F.2d 983 (7th Cir. 1973).
76. Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974); Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp.
575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
77. Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968).
78. REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON CORPORAL PUNISHMENT, National Educational Association (Wash. 1972) (hereinafter referred to as NEA REPORT). The Association's report was
based primarily on studies of schools, interviews with educators, and mental health research
results.
79. NEA REPORT at 7: (1) Physical punishment is an inefficient way to maintain
order; it usually has to be repeated over and over. (2) Physical punishment may
increase disruptive behavior. (3) Physical punishment hinders learning. (4) Physical
punishment is not suitable for any children, regardless of their socioeconomic status.
(5) Physical punishment is most often used on students who are physically weaker and
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ishment as method of discipline in schools, each directly exposing
the inherent and latent weaknesses of this form of discipline. Significantly, the conclusions are not couched in moderate language;
rather, the task force seems to have concluded unequivocally that
physical discipline rarely benefits either the individual teacher or
the individual student.
Systematically and thoroughly the task force rebutted the common arguments that have justified this method of discipline. The
material below represents a brief outline of these various rationales,
combined with the NEA respective responses.
1.

Discipline has to be maintained in some manner: Corporal pun-

ishment is totally ineffective and usually develops hostility, resentment, and dislike for the task. Effective alternatives do exist. 0
2.

It is the only thing that some students understand: This means

only that a portion of the students have not been exposed to other
more constructive forms of discipline."'
3.

Teachers must be protected: Corporal punishment is used more

often in elementary schools than in secondary schools where the
larger and stronger students attend. 2
4.

Sometimes teachers get so frustrated they just have to hit

students: The frustration lies in the inability to cope effectively with
the situation, not with the person whose behavior is exemplifying the
specific situation."
5. Students learn self-control from corporal punishment: Physical

punishment does not affect the source of the problem, but merely the
symptom. Once the threat of punishment is removed, impermissible
conduct is likely to reoccur. Additionally, it teaches that brute force
prevails."
6.

Parents use corporal punishment: Parents maintain a different

relationship with their children than do teachers. The parents represmaller than the teacher. (6) Physical punishment is often a symptom of frustration
rather than a disciplinary procedure. (7) Infliction of physical punishment is detrimental to the educator. (8) Physical punishment does not develop self-discipline. (9) Physical punishment develops aggressive hostility. (10) Physical punishment teaches that
might is right. (11) Physical punishment by educators is not comparable to that inflicted by parents. (12) Students may prefer physical punishment to other alternatives
offered them. (13) Limitations on the way physical punishment is to be used are often
regularly ignored. (14) Physical punishment is legal in many places, but its constitutionality is being challenged in several court suits. (15) The availability of physical
punishment discourages teachers from seeking more effecitive means of discipline. (16)
The use of physical punishment inclines everyone in the school community to regard
students as less than human and the school as dehumanizing.
80. Id. at 9.
81. Id. at 13.
82. Id. at 14.
83. Id. at 15.
84. Id. at 16-17.
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sent a source of security, nourishment, and love. This relationship is
rarely developed between teacher and pupil. Also, it is unlikely that
the children who are regularly beaten at home will be affected by this
form of discipline by a teacher."5
6
The conclusions and recommendations of the task force" bear
directly on the central idea espoused herein; i.e., the consideration
of corporal 'junishment in light of the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Constitution. If this form of discipline is an
ineffective, unnecessary, and counterproductive educational tool,
logic suggests that it may also be "excessive" and "degrading" and,
therefore, violative of the eighth amendment in certain instances.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Only complete naivety would permit one to believe that an
action under the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth
amendment via 42 U.S.C. § 1983 represents a panacea for all educational dilemmas. However, it is a step. It would provide relief for
the abuses which, like all extremes, have a tendency to parade to
the forefront. A system which denies constitutional protection to
instances of such physical hardship contains elementary inconsistencies, for it is the same system which has customarily recognized
the civil rights and civil liberties of all its constituents, including
those of students.
The resolution of the question of legal remedies does not dispose
of a case like Ingraham;the much larger issues remain. As opposed
to the state's interest in maintaining order in the schools, where
stands the student's interest in physical integrity? Is the infliction
of corporal punishment on school children desirable, or even necessary? Can it be constitutionally infirm under the eighth amendment
in certain instances?
The Supreme Court, in its treatment of Ingraham, must weigh
these considerations against those which favor the traditional con85. Id. at 19-20.
86. Id. at 29. The task force formulated a proposed model law outlawing corporal
punishment, which contained the following:
that any such person may, within the scope of his employment, use and apply such
amounts of physical restraint as may be reasonable and necessary:
(1) to protect himself, the pupil or others from physical injury;
(2) to obtain possession of a weapon . . . within the control of a pupil;
(3) to protect property from serious harm.
The model law also provides that this physical restraint would not be contrued to constitute
corporal punishment. Thus, the adoption of such a law would guard against chaos in the
schools and, at the same time, place the burden on the teacher to show that the physical
punishment administered was within permissable boundaries.
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cept of "spare the rod, spoil the child" and of relatively unfettered
state control of the daily operations of schools. The Court should,
however, recognize that there is sufficient constitutional basis for
applying the eighth amendment to corporal punishment in schools.
Mary H. Egger
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